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This paper estimates the readiness of the Accession Countries of Central and East Europe for EMU
or for unilateral euroisation using a fuzzy clustering algorithm. The variables to which the algorithm
is applied are suggested alternately by the criteria in the Maastricht Treaty (nominal convergence)
and by Optimum Currency Area theory (real convergence). The algorithm reveals that Estonia and
Slovenia are the leaders in both nominal and real convergence, whereas the other countries from the
1998 Accession Wave have achieved substantial results only in real convergence. Moreover, Poland
is excluded  from the leading group in the most recent years due to its worsened  economic
performance.
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50016, Italy.1 Introduction
The successful accession to membership in the European Union (EU) by the
transition-economy applicants from the Central and Eastern Europe Coun-
tries (CEECs) will throw up many challenges. One of the main ones will be
the eastward expansion of the euro area because the would-be members of
the EU will not be able to stay outside the European Monetary Union1,a s
has been the case with the several countries of Western and Northern Eu-
rope. Nevertheless, entry into the EU, which will occur only in 2004 at the
earliest, does not guarantee immediate acceptance into the monetary union
because the candidates will have to demonstrate for two years their ability
to satisfy the convergence criteria of Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, accord-
ing to the most optimistic estimates, the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe could only join the EMU in 2007. However, many economists and
especially politicians have even been arguing that the Accession countries
should ﬁx their currencies or enter into currency board arrangements based
on the European currency or even introduce the euro unilaterally as a means
of speeding up the accession and convergence processes (e.g. Nuti (2001) and
Coricelli (2001)). They put forward several reasons why the CEE countries
should join the EMU at an early date.
First, if the CEECs join the EMU they will enjoy lower risk premiums and
interest rates, as well as lower transaction costs. They will, moreover, have a
say in shaping the ECB’s monetary policy, whereas if they decide to stay out
they will lose this privilege, although the independence from the ECB will
become more imaginary than real once a small country has integrated into
the economy of the euro zone. Second, it is often argued that they satisfy
the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria and therefore it is beneﬁcial
for them to join. Next, given the likely insistence of the EU members on
adopting measures to limit the exchange rate variability of the new members
there will be no alternatives for them but to ﬁx the exchange rates within
some band (an arrangement which could prove fragile and prone to crisis)
or to enter the Estonian- or Bulgarian-style currency board (which is the
second-best solution in respect to forming a monetary union). Moreover, the
incumbent EU members might not be able to do much to keep the aspirants
out (Eichengreen and Ghironi, 2001).
In the light of these arguments, the question of the CEECs’ readiness
to join the EMU becomes even more important. Two main issues have to
1It was one of the EU-accession criteria speciﬁed in Copenhagen in 1993 which explicitly
stated that new EU members will have to ”... take on the obligations of membership,
including (...) the Economic and Monetary Union” meaning that no ’opt-out’ provision
exists for these countries.
1be addressed. First, there is the necessity of meeting the Maastricht Treaty
criteria in order to qualify. These criteria limit the ability of the candidates
to exercise monetary and ﬁscal policies at their discretion, which clearly rep-
resents a cost to be incurred by the countries on their way to the euro. Sec-
ond, abdication of sovereign monetary policy has its own costs and beneﬁts,
which have usually been assessed in the framework of the OCA theory (see
Mundell, 1961 and McKinnon, 1963), which advocated forming a monetary
union if the adjustment of the bilateral exchange rate is either ineﬀective or
unnecessary to stabilise output.
As concerns the process of joining the EU three groups of transition coun-
tries may be identiﬁed. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia started negotiations ﬁrst, and constitute what is called the 1998
Accession Group, which is argued to have made substantial progress towards
satisfying the entry requirements2. The other group, called the 2000 Acces-
sion Group, consists of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and the Slovak
Republic, which have not yet advanced as far as the ﬁrst group in the ne-
gotiation process. The rest are countries such as Croatia, which for various
reasons are not yet part of the negotiation process. Given this segregation,
a natural question to ask is whether a similar division applies to the issue of
joining the EMU. The subsequent analysis of this paper thus endeavours to
identify a group of countries which are ”more EMU-ready” or better suited
to enter into a currency board with the Euro and whether these countries
are from the 1998 Accession Group or have already implemented a currency
board arrangement.
In order to check for the existence of homogeneous groups in the CEECs
the technique of cluster analysis is employed. This technique is used to ex-
amine the similarities and dissimilarities of economic structure in the data
and to group the countries according to various sets of criteria. Given the
problem of incomplete and noisy data, the more powerful technique of fuzzy
clustering is employed. This method splits the data into groups by assigning
membership coeﬃcients indicating the degree of ”belongingness” of each ob-
ject to each of the groups, so that the highest coeﬃcient would then indicate
the group to which this country is most likely to belong. The accompanying
statistics indicate the existence of the clear-cut structure in the data.
The ﬁrst section brieﬂy describes the algorithm of fuzzy clustering, clar-
ifying its use for the problem at hand as well as the associated diagnostic
statistics used in the paper. In the second section we look at the readiness
of the applicants for the EMU from an institutional point of view according
2As the paper focuses on the countries in transition, Malta and Cyprus are omitted
from the analysis that follows.
2to their performance with respect to the Maastricht criteria. This section
attempts to answer the question of the countries’s ability to adopt the euro.
The following section looks at the real convergence of the CEECs to the EU
and to Germany in particular. This section therefore looks at the question of
the desirability of their joining the EMU. The penultimate section compares
the results of nominal vs. real convergence. The last section concludes.
2 Fuzzy clustering analysis
Cluster analysis is a well-known technique in the science of pattern recogni-
tion and is frequently applied in disciplines such as medicine, archeology etc.,
although its use in applied economic analysis is rather rare. In this paper
fuzzy clustering analysis is used, which, unlike the hard clustering algorithms
that assign each object to only one subgroup, much better equipped to an-
alyze the data where some ambiguity is present. The method is applied to
uncover the similarities of economic structure in the data across countries
and to identify homogeneous subgroups of countries with regard to sets of
economic criteria.
The algorithm of fuzzy clustering is taken from Kaufman and Rousseuw
(1990) and can brieﬂy be described as follows. The dataset consists of n
objects (countries) with p variables (various criteria used in our analysis)
for each object and is denoted by Xnp = {x1,x 2,...,xn},w h e r ee a c hxi =
{xi1,...,xip}. Each variable is standardised with mean zero and standard de-
viation one in order to treat them as having equal importance in determining
the structure3. The dissimilarity coeﬃcient between two objects is deﬁned







The algorithm minimizes the objective function C:
3In some cases, the standardisation of the variables is important to keep a variable with
high variance from dominating the cluster analysis. It is also needed in cases where the
variables are of diﬀerent magnitude and not directly comparable (e.g. budget deﬁcit and
government debt level, the latter always being much higher).
4This is the special case of the Minkowski distance metric with argument equal to 2.
There are several other distance measures for continuous data such as other Minkowski
distance metrics, the Canberra distance measure, which is very sensitive to small changes















uiv ≥ 0 for i=1 ,...,n; v =1 ,...,n
X
v
uiv =0 fori=1 ,...,n
in which uiv represents the unknown coeﬃcient of membership of object
i to cluster v,a n dk represents the number of clusters into which the data
is partitioned. The algorithm produces the matrix of coeﬃcients Unxk with
rows summing to one and showing the degree of belongingness of that object
to each of the groups. If one of the coeﬃcients is very high then it can be
said that there is a high degree of certainty that this object belongs to that
group, otherwise this object cannot be classiﬁed that easily.
In order to analyze how well the data is partitioned several statistics are











which varies from 1 (indicating well-partitioned data) to 0 (indicating
complete fuzzyness of the data). It reaches one only if for each object there
is one coeﬃcient equal to one and the others to zero and zero when all the
coeﬃcients of belongingness are 1
k.
Another useful set of statistics is the silhouette width for each object,
average silhouette width for each cluster and for total dataset. Silhouette




where a(i) is deﬁned as average dissimilarity of object i to all objects in
t h es a m ec l u s t e ra n db(i) as the minimum across all other clusters of average
4dissimilarity of object i to all objects in each cluster. When s(i) is close to
one it is implied that the object is well classiﬁed into an appropriate cluster.
A value near zero indicates the ambiguity in deciding to which cluster the
object might belong. Negative values indicate that the object is misclassiﬁed.
The corresponding averages for each cluster and for the total dataset indicate
how well each cluster’s and the total dataset’s partitioning has been done.
3 EMU and Maastricht Criteria
The Maastricht Treaty laid down a set of criteria to be fulﬁlled by countries
aspiring to participate in the EMU. Their declared aim was convergence
in both nominal and ﬁscal terms ensuring that monetary and ﬁscal policy
converged in order not to disrupt functioning of the EMU in the future5.I n
formal terms, the criteria for nominal convergence are that a country must
have an inﬂation rate within 1.5% of the average inﬂation rate of the three
members with the lowest inﬂation rates and a long-run bond yield within 2%
of the average of the bond yields of the same three countries. Furthermore,
the Treaty required that the exchange rate must have been stable within
the ± 15% ERM bounds for at least two years. As regards ﬁscal policy, the
budget deﬁcit should be no higher than 3% of GDP and public debt less than
60% of GDP.
The same set of qualiﬁcations will be applied to any future applicant.
Although the earliest date for the candidates to enter the EMU is estimated
to be the year 2006 and criteria are to be complied with only for a year before
admission, it is nevertheless useful to see whether the Accession Countries
represent a uniform group with respect to stability orientation. First, it might
indicate how easy it will be for the applicants to comply in the future with
the provisions of the Stability and Growth pact, and second, it might show
whether the countries obey the criteria when conducting their macroeconomic
policies in order to show their commitment to the accession process.
Given that the criteria were criticised for focusing on the short one-year
period of assessment before qualiﬁcation6 data for longer time periods is used
here7. Table 1 shows the corresponding values for accession countries and
Croatia as well as an average for 12 EMU members. The casual inspection of
5When supplemented by the Growth and Stability Pact.
6Two years for the exchange rate stability criterion.
7We split the data into three overlapping time periods of 1993-2001, 1997-2001, and
2001 and used the averages over the corresponding periods. Thus, it might be argued, a
clearer picture of true ”stability orientation” of the economy might be obtained and any























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rthe data reveals several things. First, most of the countries tried to keep their
budget deﬁcits low, which proved to be a hard task. During the last eight
years ﬁve out of eleven countries in the sample had an average budget deﬁcit
lower than the three per cent requirement. In recent years the budget deﬁcit
has diminished for Bulgaria and Hungary but has increased for Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Second, the debt levels are comfort-
ably below the 60% criterion except in Bulgaria and Hungary (and the EU
average itself). Third, volatility of exchange rates (as measured by the stan-
dard deviation of the log diﬀerence in bilateral exchange rates against the
German mark, (which is preferred to the volatility of exchange rates against
the ECU) is low for countries which ﬁxed their currencies against DM. By
the year 2001 it had reduced substantially for almost all countries with the
notable exception of Poland. Next, inﬂation rates have dropped below ten
per cent except for Romania. This has had an eﬀect on the lending rates8 al-
though the diﬀerence between Polish lending rates and inﬂation is above ten
per cent, indicating the commitment of the Central Bank of Poland to reduce
inﬂationary expectations brought about by the recent inﬂation increase.
I run the algorithm for three subsamples and in each case the optimal
number of clusters was chosen by maximising the average silhouette width of
the dataset (Table 2 reports only the best partition for each period). Dunn‘s
coeﬃcient is above 0.5, indicating the presence of some fuzzyness in the data,
and the average silhouette widths, showing the extent to which the groups
formed are diﬀerent from each other, are higher than 0.5 which is a sign that
the structure is present in the data (Kaufman and Rousseuw, 1990).
For the sample of 1993-2001 the optimal number of groups is two - one
comprising Bulgaria and Croatia whilst the other countries form the other
group. This should come as no surprise because it has been quite a turbulent
period for the transition countries and most of them have had to stabilise
and restructure their economies which has had an eﬀect on their economic
and monetary performance. During that period Bulgaria and Croatia are
characterised by extremely high levels of exchange rate volatility, inﬂation
and interest rates compared to the other countries in the sample; therefore
they were identiﬁed as a distinct group. For the rest of the countries no fur-
ther conclusions can be made for this sample and, therefore, it is instructive
to look at more recent periods.
During the period of 1998-2001 we observe several noticeable changes.
The statistics indicate that the data is best partitioned into four groups. The
8This assumption is made because of the data unavailability for the CEECs. The Eu-
ropean Commission in its regular reports on countries’ progress towards accession look at
the lending rates of over one year when assessing the countries’ performance, therefore we
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3ﬁrst group is comprised of Estonia, Slovenia and Latvia and is characterised
by low values for all criteria except for exchange rate volatility which varies
from low (Estonia) to high level (Latvia). Apart from the later criterion and
high inﬂation rates, this group performs in line with the EU average in respect
of the Maastricht criteria. The second group consists of the EU average and
Bulgaria which have been put together primarily due to the very low exchange
rate volatility, low budget deﬁcit and high level of public debt, which is above
the 60 per cent limit. Disregarding the public debt criterion these two groups
can be treated as one group, that is those Accession Countries which have
performed in line with the EMU members according to stability orientation
criteria. Interestingly, two of the three CEECs (Bulgaria and Estonia) that
oﬃcially entered into currency board arrangements are in this group. On the
other hand, Romania is a distinct outlier with very high values for all criteria
except for the public debt and therefore it has been classiﬁed as a singleton
(i.e. a group consisting only of one member). The rest of the countries were
grouped together because they have a high level of budget deﬁcits, an average
level of public debt, average to high exchange rate volatility but mixed results
for inﬂation and interest rates.
Given that the Maastricht criteria are to be applied to assess the perfor-
m a n c eo fw o u l d - b em e m b e r so n ey e a rb e f o r ee n t r y ,i ti s ,t h e r e f o r e ,u s e f u lt o
look at the latest data and to see what the current economic and ﬁnancial
situation is in the CEECs. With that in mind I ran the algorithm for the
data of year 2001 alone9. This time the best partition consists of ﬁve groups,
although many regularities from the previous subsample are still present.
Estonia and Slovenia again form the group with low values for all criteria
except for the interest rates. Considering the fact that we use lending rates
instead of government bond yields as speciﬁed by the Maastricht Treaty, this
group may be regarded as the best performing one. Latvia and Lithuania
form the other group, which follows it closely, although they have higher
exchange rate volatility. As in the previous period, Bulgaria and the average
EU member form the third group because of the high debt level, although the
inﬂation rate in Bulgaria is too high by EMU standards. Allowing for some
ﬂexibility in interpreting the Maastricht criteria it may be argued that the
countries from these three groups are the best performers and by now have
managed to bring the government ﬁnances and domestic monetary situation
under control. Again, the interesting fact is that this time all three countries
which implemented the currency board arrangements are included10. Roma-
9Subsample of 2000 - 2001 is used to calculate the exchange rate volatility.
10High level of exchange rate volatility of the Lithuanian Lit against the DM may be
explained by the fact that it is ﬁxed against the basket of the currencies, with the US
dollar in sizeable proportion. As for Bulgaria, its public debt declines constantly each
9nia on its own forms another group again because of grossly breaching all
the criteria and the rest of the countries constitute the last group, which is
characterised by high budget deﬁcit and average to high values for the other
criteria.
Looking across all the subsamples the following conclusions can be reached
(Table 3 summarises the ﬁndings). During the whole sample period of the
last eight years the countries have shown mixed performance, so that no de-
tailed partitioning can be made except for separating the countries which
have undergone some serious crisis during that period. Nevertheless, looking
separately at the recent period there appears to be a clear-cut segmenta-
tion among the CEECs. All three Baltic states, Bulgaria and Slovenia seem
to make a group of countries, which is well ahead as concerns the stability
orientation of the economy and expressed by the Maastricht criteria. An in-
teresting correlation is observed that all three CEECs who implemented the
currency board arrangement against the Euro are in this group.
4 OCA Criteria and Economic Convergence
4.1 OCA Criteria Explained
It is often argued in the literature that although in the nineties the EU
countries were converging in nominal terms as was manifested in general
compliance with the Maastricht Criteria, real convergence was far from be-
ing achieved and one could even have pointed out real divergence between
some countries. As a consequence, the countries whose initial conditions
are unfavourable and which are unable to use a national monetary policy to
adjust to speciﬁc shocks will ﬁnd themselves on low growth and high unem-
ployment paths. As pointed out by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b) and
others, the Maastricht criteria do not ensure the real convergence which is
required for the successful functioning of a monetary union. This idea of real
convergence was ﬁrst put forward by Mundell (1961) and later revived by
Krugman (1990). Krugman developed the foundations of the OCA theory,
which stated that two countries should form a monetary union in the case
of prevalence of a high degree of intra-trade among the members and the
absence of any profound asymmetry in the pattern of shocks impacting their
economies.
As OCA theory states, there are certain beneﬁts and costs associated with
adopting a single currency that depend on the degree of convergence of the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































deconomies. The beneﬁts are associated with economising on exchange costs
and with importing the credibility of the union’s central bank, thus reducing
the inﬂationary expectations and level of inﬂation. This point is illustrated
by the example of Bulgaria, which entered the currency board arrangement
in order to combat inﬂation and stabilise its economy. Another clear case is
Estonia, whose level of inﬂation was substantially lower than that of the other
CEECs. As for the associated costs they are essentially the negative of the
beneﬁts of having an independent monetary policy and exchange rate, which
a r eu s e f u la sam e a n so fc o p i n gw i t hs h o c k st h a ta r ea s y m m e t r i cb e t w e e nt h e
potential monetary union partners. The less eﬀective the monetary policy is
in counteracting the idiosyncratic shocks by adjusting the nominal exchange
rate, the lower the costs. Other domestic conditions such as suﬃcient labour
mobility or ﬁscal federalism also reduce the need for independent monetary
policy.
The OCA criteria are a useful benchmark for evaluating the costs and
beneﬁts of any exchange rate arrangement. First, the qualitative analysis of
the costs and beneﬁts and comparative studies can be conducted. One of
the examples for European countries is by De Grauwe and Yunus (1999). On
the sample of CEECs there are several papers by Boone and Maurel (1998
and 1999) and Habib (2000) as well as by Fidrmuc and Schardax (2000).
Second, the OCA theory was rendered operational through cross-country
estimations of the eﬀect on the variability of the bilateral exchange rates
by the asymmetry of the business cycles and other explanatory variables.
This was ﬁrst done by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a) for industrialised
countries and later adopted to CEECs by Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil
(1998).
Notwithstanding the popularity of the approach, recently there has been
growing criticism of the classical OCA literature. Two basic points have been
made. First, the OCA literature has allegedly failed to consider the dynamic
and endogenous nature of the criteria because economists have often applied
OCA criteria as if they were taking a snapshot of a motionless object. How-
ever, these characteristics could react to the very policy decision to ﬁxt h e
exchange rate, adopt another country’s currency or join a currency union.
In other words, the OCA literature does not take into account the Lucas
Critique and considers the several criteria as exogenous parameters. Frankel
and Rose (1998) claimed that the OCA criteria are in fact endogenous and
found that greater integration resulted in more highly synchronised business
cycles. According to this result, a country that does not satisfy the OCA cri-
teria could join a currency union eliminating exchange risk and transactions
costs. Reduced costs would foster trade integration, which, in turn, would
increase the correlation of business cycles. Hence, the endogeneity of OCA
12criteria poses some limitations to a static application of the theory. Second,
the OCA literature has not paid enough attention to the increasing role of
international ﬁnancial markets and capital mobility.
These limitations contribute even more to the already complicated cost-
beneﬁt analysis of a common currency. However, for the purpose of the paper
they have little relevance. Here we are more concerned with identiﬁcation of
the homogeneous groups among CEECs, so the analysis will indicate if there
is a group of countries whose current nominal and real convergence with the
EMU is at a higher stage. If the criteria are endogenous then these countries
will have some competitive advantage over the other applicants and the likely
structural changes and catch-up processes will be less dramatic.
4.2 Empirical results for economic convergence
4.2.1 Choice of variables
The choice of variables to analyse the economic convergence of CEECs was
inspired by the OCA criteria following the work of Artis and Zhang (1998).
For the sample of ten accession countries I collected the monthly and an-
nual data (see Table 4) starting from 1993 from various sources which are
described in the Appendix.
1) Synchronisation of business cycles
The popular choice to implement the OCA criterion related to symmetry
of output shocks is by studying the cross-correlation of the cyclical compo-
nents of output (e.g. Artis and Zhang, 1998). Due to the data unavailability
of quarterly GDP growth rates11 I decided to follow the approach of Artis
and Zhang (1998), who identiﬁed the symmetry of output shocks with the
cross-correlation of the cyclical components of monthly industrial production
series. Whereas the aggregate GDP estimates for the eurozone are available12
this is not so for the industrial production data, and so for the purpose of
the estimation the Germany monthly industrial production index was taken.
T h ec h o i c ew a sj u s t i ﬁed on the grounds of the existence of what is called the
”European business cycle” (see Artis and Zhang, 1995), and it is conﬁrmed
when we look at Figure 1, which shows the quarterly GDP and industrial
production growth rates for the Eurozone, Germany and Estonia13.
11Romanian National Statistical Oﬃce does not produce quarterly GDP estimates at
all; Bulgaria has started to publish them only since 2000. For the other countries the
qurterly data from 1993 would give only 30 observations up to Q3 2001.
12For example from Beyer and Hendry (2001)
13I was unable to locate the monthly industrial production index for Estonia at all





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. The quarter on quarter growth series of German industrial output,
Estonian GDP (all right axis), Eurozone GDP and Germany GDP (left axis).
Data is 1st quarter of 1994 to 2nd quarter of 2001.
Given the close comovement of the series I decided to use German in-
dustrial production as a proxy for EMU output movement. In the light of
t h eh e a t e dd e b a t ea st ow h a tt y p eo fﬁltering is more appropriate I use two
ﬁltering techniques. First, the industrial production series were seasonally
adjusted and detrended using the Hodrich-Prescott (H-P) ﬁlter with the value
of the dampening parameter equal to 50,00014. Second, as an alternative, I
use the twelfth diﬀerences of the logs of the series (i.e. the growth rate of
each month relative to the same month of the previous year). Both methods
produced comparable results although slightly higher values in the former
case, which are used in the analysis thereof. The cross-correlations vis-a-vis
Germany were calculated for the whole sample and subsamples. Figure 2
illustrates that the correlation between CEECs and German business cycles
h a sg r o w nc o n s i d e r a b l ya n dh a sat e n d e n c yt oc o n v e r g et oav e r yc l o s er a n g e
for all countries. However, the increased divergence after the beginning of
the year 2001 merits special attention.
and quarterly GDP growh rate for Estonia for which monthly unemployment rate is not
available either.















Figure 2. Time - varying correlations of industrial production (CEECs vis-‘a-vis
Germany over previous three years). Unemployment correlations for Bulgaria
and GDP growth rate correlations for Estonia
2)Volatility of the real exchange rate (RER)
According to the OCA criteria, the costs of monetary union are associ-
ated with the loss of a separate exchange rate. By inﬂuencing the nominal
exchange rate the monetary policy presumably changes the real exchange
rate which acts as a shock absorber. If there has been little cause for varia-
tion in the exchange rate then not much will be lost when moving to a single
currency. In this study we represent the variation in the exchange rates as
the standard deviation of the log-diﬀerence of real DM exchange rate, where
deﬂation is accomplished using the relative wholesale price index.
3)Openness to trade
This criterion is assumed to be represented by trade intensity between
EMU members as a whole and each CEEC, i.e. for any country i as (xiEMU+
miEMU)/(xi+mi), which is the ratio of exports and imports to EMU members
over total imports and exports of country i.
4)I n ﬂation criteria
The recent addition to the classical OCA theory is that ” a strong incen-
tive for monetary union is created by an assurance that the union’s inﬂation
will be low” (Artis and Zhang, 1998). This criterion is measured by the
annual inﬂation diﬀerential of each CEE country against average EMU inﬂa-
tion.
164.2.2 Estimation results
The data is split into four overlapping periods: 1993 -2001, 1995 -2001, 1997
- 2001 and 1999-2001. This was done in order to see whether the results for
the total sample were inﬂuenced by the processes of economic restructuring
and transition turbulence in the mid-nineties and in order to look at the
recent development in the CEECs progress towards economic convergence
to the EMU. Several points about the data, which is reported in Table 5,
should be mentioned. One of the most important characteristics, that is
of business cycle correlation, increased dramatically towards the end of the
estimation period and showed the tendency to converge to a close range for
all countries by the beginning of the year 2001, as illustrated in Figure 2.
Although this ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by other studies (Boone and Maurel, 1998
and Fidrmuc and Schardax, 2000), the short time period of only one full
business cycle and the presence of only a few supply and demand shocks
makes it less robust and conclusive then we would like it to be. The high
degree of trade with the EMU countries also merits attention, with the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland already reaching the average of EMU intra-
trade (around 67%). The volatility of the real exchange rate has decreased
for countries that used exchange rate arrangements close to the ﬁxed rates,
but stayed higher for Poland and Romania for all the sample and quite high
for Latvia and Lithuania. The inﬂation diﬀerential was reduced to single
digits since 1998 for all the countries except Romania.
Application of the clustering algorithm reveals a substantial level of fuzzy-
ness in the data (Dunn’s coeﬃcient is around 0.5) and slightly worse results
than in the previous section (average silhouette width is around 0.5 for all
subsamples).
Thus, the results of the estimation for the whole period of 1993-2001
show the presence of three groups of countries. The best performing group
consists of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia, which
show low volatility of RER (with the exception of Poland and probably the
Czech Republic), very high trade openness of above 60%, and relatively high
degree of business cycles synchronisation (see Figure 3), although the group
statistics for inﬂation rate is less uniform. The second group is formed by
Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, which have much worse values for all the
parameters. The third group, consisting of Bulgaria and Slovakia, is much
the same as the previous group, as can be seen in the low values of the
individual silhouette width (with Slovakia having a negative value indicating









Cluster average with min -max 
interval in percentage to the 
total dataset average
Figure 3. Statistics for the group of best-performers (the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia), 1993-2001.
The results of the test for the 1995 - 2001 period are almost identical to
the previous ones. The only exception is that the group of best perform-
ing countries is joined by Latvia, the performance of which has improved
substantially according to all four criteria.
The analysis of the period 1997-2001 indicates the improved performance
of several countries, particularly Slovakia, which is grouped with the best-
performers. The algorithm has identiﬁed only two groups in this sample -
one of the ﬁve countries from the ﬁrst Accession wave along with Latvia and
Slovakia and the second group consisting of the other three countries, which



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cluster average with min -max 
interval in percentage to the 
total dataset average
Figure 4. Statistics for the group of the best-performers (the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia), 1997-2001.
In order to analyse any changes in the performance of CEECs after ﬁve
of the countries negotiated an accession status (and were subsequently called
the 1998 Accession Group) I look at the subsample of the 1999-2001 data.
The results indicate that the best partition for this period was of four groups
(see Figure 5), the best-performing group not including Poland this time due
to its high RER volatility, which is instead grouped with Slovakia, exhibiting
high volatility as well. The number two group consists of Latvia, Lithuania,
and the Slovak Republic, which are separated because of low business cycles
correlation. Bulgaria shows negative correlation between its and German








Cluster average with min -max 
interval in percentage to the 
total dataset average
Figure 5. Statistics for the group of best-performers (Czech R., Estonia,
Hungary, Slovenia) and Poland separately (the dashed line), 1999 - 2001.
The summary of the ﬁndings is as follows (see Table 6). It is possible to
identify the group of countries which, by the OCA criteria, is more suited to
join the EMU or to euroise. The criteria indicate that this group of coun-
tries is the 1998 Accession Group, joined over some periods, by Latvia and
Slovakia. It seems, therefore, that the progress in liberalising the economy
and restructuring as prescribed, monitored and assessed by the European
Commission is correlated with successful integration into the EU economic
area if the OCA theory is used. Interestingly, the analysis conﬁrmed that
Poland in recent years is lagging behind the more successful applicants and its
acceptance will become more a political issue unless it speeds up its reforms.
5 Maastricht and OCA criteria compared
How do our identiﬁcations of groups based on nominal convergence compare
with the those based on the OCA criteria? If we focus on the latest data
period, several interesting conclusions may be drawn. First, only Estonia
and Slovenia are classiﬁed as the countries that achieved both substantial
nominal and real convergence with the EMU countries. In both parts of the
analysis these two countries are grouped together in all the subsamples and
they always form a part of the most advanced group. Therefore, Estonia and
Slovenia may be regarded as the main candidates for joining the EMU among
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dWave (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) are leading only in real convergence
while lagging behind in terms of inﬂation achievement, the stance of ﬁscal
policy and exchange rate behaviour. Second, Poland is shown to lag behind
the rest of the countries from the 1998 Accession Wave and it does not
make a part of the leading group even by the OCA criteria during the last
years. Fourth, all three countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania) that have
implemented the currency board arrangements show considerable nominal
convergence but only Estonia is leading in economic convergence as well.
Fifth, Romania with its high inﬂation, interest rate, loose ﬁscal policy and
volatile exchange rate is a clear outlier and during the recent periods it is
classiﬁed as a separate group according to the Maastricht criteria. Neither
it shows any substantial economic convergence to the EMU.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analysed the empirical evidence on the topic of readiness of
CEECs to join the EMU or euroise their economies. The problem was split
into three parts and cluster analysis to identify the groups of countries that
are closer to being ready to do so was employed in each case.
First, the paper looked at the Maastricht Criteria as a set of requirements
to be fulﬁlled by the applicants in order to qualify. Support was found for
the existence of a clear-cut structure in the data. Several countries, among
them all the CEECs that have implemented the currency board arrangement,
joined by Slovenia and Latvia, consistently outperformed others in coming
close to satisfying the Maastricht Criteria. Assuming that the countries do
attempt to satisfy the criteria to look ”ready” for the EMU this evidence
might be an indicator of considerable tensions and problems of transition
economies in satisfying the Maastricht criteria beforehand. Whether the
stability orientation of an economy is improved by ﬁxing its currency against
the euro remains a question deserving further attention.
Second, the question of the economic convergence of CEECs to the EU
was tackled by analysing their performance with respect to the OCA cri-
teria. The ﬁndings regarding the best-performing group, consisting of the
countries of 1998 Accession Group contradict the ﬁndings about the nominal
convergence as only Slovenia and Estonia are leaders both in nominal and
real convergence. Additionally, the recent economic and restructuring per-
formance of Poland is identiﬁed as the main reason for associating it with
the other group of countries, which are not converging at such a fast rate to
t h eE Ue c o n o m i ca r e a .
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257 Appendix
7.1 Data sources and description
Maastricht criteria data
Budget Deﬁcit:
CEECs’ data is taken from EBRD (2000) and Deutsche Bank Research;
EMU countries’ data from Eurostat (2001)
Public Debt:
Croatia - from WDI database (World Bank);
Lithuania - NSO of Lithuania; the rest of CEECs’ from Deutsche
Bank Research
Exchange rates:
all from IFS (IMF)
Inﬂation:
CEECs’ data - EBRD (2000), Deutsche Bank Research and
national statistics;
EMU average inﬂation is taken from OECD Economic Outlook (2001)
Interest rates:
Slovenia - Slovenian Central Bank; rest of CEECs from EBRD (2000);
EMU interest rates from Eurostat(2000)
OCA criteria data
Business cycles correlation:
Bulgarian unemployment, Polish, Slovak Republic, Slovenian industrial
output from PlanEcon Monthly Report (various issues); the rest of
CEECs’ data and Germany industrial output and unemployemnt from
IFS (IMF) and NSO of Estonia; Eurozone GDP from Beyer et al (2001).
Real Exchange Rates:
all from IFS (IMF)
Trade openness:
all from European Commision Statistics
Inﬂation diﬀerential:
CEECs’ data - EBRD (2000); EMU average inﬂation is taken from OECD
Economic Outlook (2001)
Unemployment:
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1.  Boreiko`s paper is an interesting attempt to formalize some of the important strands in the 
discussion on the European Union`s enlargement.  Both the legal framework of the 
accession process and official statements of the majority of accession countries imply that 
their next step – to be undertaken sooner rather than later – is the membership in the 
Economic and Monetary Union. The major part of the literature covering that subject 
seems to focus only on the issue of the exchange rate regime – what choice would be 
optimal from that point of view
1.  However, finding an optimal solution is somewhat 
complicated, because of different requirements of real and nominal convergence. The 
former, usually understood as the process closing the income gap between EU and 
accession countries, brings indisputable benefits. The latter, meaning control over 
inflation, interest rates, exchange rates etc., is also beneficial in the long run, but when 
pursued in the relatively short period, brings substantial costs attributable to the process of 
delivering price stability. Finding a balance between nominal and real convergence 
becomes then a very complicated issue when addressed form an empirical perspective.  
2.  Boreiko`s approach is refreshingly simple: let us measure both real and nominal 
convergence for various periods of time. Results of such an exercise may enable us to 
assess the performance of accession countries in more objective way. This exercise 
constitutes, in my opinion, the most relevant part of the paper. I like the idea of applying 
multivariate statistical tools, particularly pattern recognition techniques, to the problem; 
moreover, I think that Boreiko is right assuming that the nature of the problem requires 
application of “fuzziness”. I can only praise the paper for clear and comprehensive 
presentation of the method applied. 
3.  I have really only one critical comment to make regarding the technical part of the paper. 
Notwithstanding mostly intuitive results I would feel more certain if their robustness 
could be more extensively checked. My suggestion would be twofold. First, to apply 
                                                           
1 Cf. P. Gaspar (2001), Real and Nominal Convergence of Pre-Accession Economies and the Choice of 
Exchange Rate Regime, International Centre for Economic Growth, mimeo, Deutsche Bundesbank (2001), 
Währungspolitische Aspekte der EU-Erweiterung, Monatsbericht, Oktober, 15-31, and Boreiko`s references.  28
different metrics within fuzzy cluster analysis; second, to apply different pattern 
recognition techniques. Some of Dmitri`s remarks in our personal communication seemed 
to support the idea that his result are robust enough and some of this work has been 
already done. It would be nice to have this written explicitly. 
4.  I like the idea of applying the same approach to the measurement of both real and nominal 
convergence. I understand reasons behind equaling real convergence with OCA theory 
requirements and nominal convergence with Maastricht criteria. Nevertheless, there are 
two issues here I have some problems with. First is the well-known problem of 
endogeneity of OCA criteria
2. EU accession will be indisputably a major factor 
influencing both real and nominal convergence. One can try to argue that the strength of 
the factor will be stronger for countries that are “further” from the EMU. That simply 
means that results Boreiko got now may be prone to serious disruption after some time 
accession countries spend within the EU. The second issue is the different implication of 
one kind of exchange rate volatility for real and nominal convergence, as they are 
understood in the paper. From an OCA perspective any exchange rate volatility means 
that losing one´s  own currency may be harmful or, at the very least costly, for the country 
concerned, especially in the case of asymmetric shocks. However, the Maastricht criteria 
treat very differently appreciation and depreciation of the currency. The former is not an 
obstacle in the process of EMU accession, the latter – definitely so
3. Some of the 
accession countries` currencies appreciated, even in nominal terms, in the 1990s (this is 
also the case of Poland). That may mean problems in terms of real convergence, but it 
does not mean the exchange rate instability in terms of Maastricht criteria. I am afraid I do 
not have any practical suggestions how to cope with this problem here – some metrics 
may be applied which treat the direction of change differently but they will complicate 
tremendously the algorithm used. I am, however, convinced that the problem is important 
enough to be mentioned in these comments. 
5.  My last - and truly minor - remark regards the use of industrial production as a proxy for 
GDP. The share of industrial output in the GDP diminished substantially in the 1990s in 
most countries studied by Boreiko, so I have some doubts regarding the validity of this 
approach, particularly for the longest sample studied. I do understand problems with 
                                                           
2 Cf. J.A.Frankel, A.K.Rose (1998), The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria, Economic 
Journal, 108, 1009-1025; G.Corsetti, P.Pesenti, Self-validating optimum currency areas, paper presented at the 
2002 AEA Meetings in Atlanta. 
3 It is, probably, not only a coincidence that this argument may improve Poland`s position in the results. 
However, I am convinced that this issue is truly relevant for the problem this paper addressed.  29
obtaining data on GDP, I also know that algorithms applied by some researchers (for 
example, Cuche (2000) for decomposing statistically quarterly GDP data into monthly 
figures may become another source of noise. I think, nevertheless, that some form of 
checking the robustness of results for business cycle convergence would be a nice addition 




Cuche, Nicolas A. (2000): "Monetary Policy Rules and Indicators: Empirical 
Evidence for Switzerland", Studienzentrum Gerzensee 
(http://www.szgerzensee.ch/publications) 
 Documentos de Trabajo
Banco Central de Chile
Working Papers
Central Bank of Chile
NÚMEROS ANTERIORES PAST ISSUES
 La  serie de  Documentos de  Trabajo en  versión PDF  puede  obtenerse gratis en la  dirección  electrónica:
http://www.bcentral.cl/Estudios/DTBC/doctrab.htm.  Existe la  posibilidad de  solicitar  una  copia
impresa con un costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se
pueden hacer por fax: (56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl.
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://www.bcentral.cl/Estudios/DTBC/doctrab.htm. Printed versions can be ordered individually for
US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2) 6702231
or e-mail: bcch@bcentral.cl.
DTBC-188
Monetary Integration in the Southern Cone:
Mercosur is not Like the EU?
Ansgar Belke y Daniel Gros
Octubre 2002
DTBC-187
Infrastructure Compression and Public Sector Solvency in
Latin America
César Calderón, William Easterly y Luis Servén
Octubre 2002
DTBC-186
The Ouput Cost of Latin America’s Infrastructure Gap
César Calderón y Luis Servén
Octubre 2002
DTBC-185
How did Latin America’s Infrastructure Fare in the Era of
Macroeconomic Crises?
César Calderón, William Easterly y Luis Servén
Octubre 2002
DTBC-184
The Direction of Causality between Financial Development and
Economic Growth
César Calderón y Lin Liu
Octubre 2002
DTBC-183
A Review of the Literature on Early Warning Systems for
Banking Crises
Alejandro Gaytán y Christian A. Johnson
Septiembre 2002DTBC-182




Política Monetaria y Mecanismos de Transmisión: Nuevos
Elementos para una Vieja Discusión
Verónica Mies, Felipe Morandé y Matías Tapia
Septiembre 2002
DTBC-180
Turnover and Regulation:The Chilean Pension Fund Industry
Solange Berstein y Alejandro Micco
Septiembre 2002
DTBC-179
Empalme PIB: Series Anuales y Trimestrales de 1986 a 1995,
Base 1996. Documento Metodológico
Víctor Correa, Antonio Escandón, René Luengo y José Venegas
Septiembre 2002
DTBC-178
An Evaluation of Monetary Regime Options for Latin America
Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein y Paolo Mauro
Agosto 2002
DTBC-177
Desestacionalización de Series Económicas: El Procedimiento
Usado por el Banco Central de Chile
Héctor Felipe Bravo, Leonardo Luna, Víctor Correa y Francisco Ruiz
Agosto 2002
DTBC-176




Dollarization and Economic Performance: What do We Really
Know?
Sebastian Edwards e I. Igal Magendzo
Agosto 2002
DTBC-174
Productivity and Economic Growth: The Case of Chile
Harald Beyer B. y Rodrigo Vergara M.
Agosto 2002
DTBC-173
Greenfield FDI vs. Mergers and Acquisitions:
Does the Distinction Matter?
César Calderón, Norman Loayza y Luis Servén
Agosto 2002